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Many philosophers claim that the neurocomputational framework of predictive processing
entails a globally inferentialist and representationalist view of cognition. Here, I contend that
this is not correct. I argue that, given the theoretical commitments these philosophers endorse,
no structure within predictive processing systems can be rightfully identified as a
representational vehicle. To do so, I first examine some of the theoretical commitments these
philosophers share, and show that these commitments provide a set of necessary conditions
the satisfaction of which allows us to identify representational vehicles. Having done so, I
introduce a predictive processing system capable of active inference, in the form of a simple
robotic “brain”. I examine it thoroughly, and show that, given the necessary conditions
highlighted above, none of its components qualifies as a representational vehicle. I then
consider and allay some worries my claim could raise. I consider whether the
anti-representationalist verdict thus obtained could be generalized, and provide some reasons
favoring a positive answer. I further consider whether my arguments here could be blocked
by allowing the same representational vehicle to possess multiple contents, and whether my
arguments entail some extreme form of revisionism, answering in the negative in both cases.
A quick conclusion follows.
Keywords: Anti-representationalism, Predictive processing, Structural representations,
Mental content, Sensorimotor contingencies
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Predictive processing and anti-representationalism
1 - Introduction
Many philosophers argue that the neurocomputational framework of predictive processing
(PP) entails a form of global representationalism and inferentialism about cognition. Their
reasoning seems the following: PP casts perception as a top-down process in which brains try
to actively predict the incoming sensory inputs. Since this process approximates Bayesian
inferences, PP is an inferentialist theory of perception (e.g. Kiefer 2017). But inferences
requires representations; and in fact, PP extensively quantifies over generative models,
which, being models, are structural representations: vehicles representing their targets by
mirroring their inner relational structure (e.g. Gładziejewski 2016; Kiefer and Hohwy 2018;
2019). Since the same kind of top-down processing appears to explain cognitive processes in
general (Friston 2009; 2010; Hohwy 2015; Spratling 2016), then cognitive processes in
general are inferential processes involving representations. As a consequence, inferentialism
and representationalism hold about cognition in general.1
Here, I scrutinize these interpretations. I argue that, given the theoretical commitments
they endorse, the physical structures instantiating generative models do not seem to qualify as
representational vehicles. Rather, they appear as non-representational structures instantiating
an agent’s mastery of sensorimotor contingencies (i.e. the ways in which bodily movements
systematically alter sensory states). So, if my arguments are on the right track, and PP really
has the explanatory breadth most of its supporters believe2, then PP seems to naturally lead
2 Importantly, the claim that PP explains cognition in general is highly speculative, and some cognitive
processes might lie beyond the explanatory reach of PP (see Williams 2020). Here, I assume for the sake of
argument that PP has the explanatory breadth the proponents of its inferentialist-representationalist reading
believe. Given this assumption, if my arguments are correct, then global anti-representationalism seemingly
follows. Yet, if that assumption is not correct, then my arguments only support a form of limited
1 This reconstruction surely downplays the differences between “radical” and “conservative” interpretations of
PP (see Clark 2015a; Gładziejewski 2017). Yet, since both interpretations are committed to representationalism
and inferentialism, I here clump them together.
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towards global anti-representationalism; that is, anti-representationalism about cognition in
general.
To substantiate my claim, I examine a minimal PP system: a simple robotic “brain” able to
predict the incoming input and to act out certain predictions through active inference. I argue
that, given the relevant theoretical commitments endorsed by inferentialist and
representationalist readings of PP, nothing in that “brain” appears to qualify as a
representational vehicle. I also argue that the same conclusion likely generalizes to other PP
systems. In this way, the physical structures instantiating generative models will more
naturally appear as non-representational structures instantiating an agent’s sensorimotor
mastery.
Importantly, my argument is not based on Ramsey’s (2007) job-description challenge.3
Thus, my argument differs from other popular arguments claiming that PP is not a
representationalist theory (Orlandi 2014; 2016; 2018; Downey 2018). These arguments
consider different seemingly representational PP posits (e.g. priors, predictions, etc.) and
argue that, on their own, these posits function either as detectors or as mere biases. Since
detectors and biases fail the job-description challenge (i.e. they do not perform any
representational function), these arguments conclude that PP is not really a
representationalist theory, because its posits are not really representational posits. Proponents
of the inferentialist and representationalist readings of PP, however, contend that these
arguments simply miss the mark, because, on the representationalist reading they favor, the
relevant representational posit is the entire generative model, of which priors, predictions and
the like are just parts (e.g. Kiefer 2017: 11-12; Kiefer and Hohwy 2018: 2394-2395).4 Here, I
will directly confront this representationalist reading on its own terms.
4 See (Sims and Pezzulo 2021) for a nice rational reconstruction of this debate.
3 Many thanks to the reviewers for having suggested expanding upon this point, and to Nina Poth who advised
me to make this point explicit from the onset.
anti-representationalism: representations might still be involved in the cognitive processes PP does not account
for. Many thanks to an anonymous reviewer for having pressed me to clarify this point.
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I structure the essay as follows. Section 2 briefly5 introduces PP, showing how generative
models and sensorimotor contingencies are related. Section 3 identifies some theoretical
commitments of the representationalist and inferentialist view of PP, showing that they form a
set of necessary conditions the satisfaction of which allows us to identify representational
vehicles. Section 4 introduces a simple PP system in the form of a robotic “brain”, and argues
that none of its structures appears to satisfy all the conditions previously identified. Section 5
argues that the anti-representationalist verdict thus obtained likely generalizes to more
complex PP systems, and responds to two worries raised by the reviewers. Lastly, section 6
succinctly concludes the essay.
2 - Predictive processing: a short introduction
As a theory of perception, PP starts by assuming that sensory states are under-informative
in respect to their worldly causes. Each retinal image, for instance, could in principle have
been caused by indefinitely many environmental layouts (e.g. Palmer 1999: 25). So, to
perceive, brains must estimate the causes of their sensory inputs, by combining
under-informative signals and some prior knowledge on how these signals have likely been
produced. PP suggests such an estimate is found by inverting a generative model operating
according to a predictive coding algorithm (Friston 2005).
Generative models are data structures capturing how sensory states might have been
produced. Sampling from these models can generate sensory states (e.g. Hinton 2007a),
which are predicted (or expected) under the model. This procedure can be intuitively
understood as realizing a mapping from external causes (e.g. carrots) to predictable sensory
states, given these causes (e.g. orange retinal images).6
6 To model rich bodies of data such as our sensory states, generative models must be hierarchically organized, so
as to capture the hierarchical nesting of worldly causes. However, this only means that each hierarchical layer
learns to predict only the layer directly below, predicting the patterns of activation it displays (e.g. Hinton
5 As PP is now fairly well-known among philosophers, I will only cover the most essential aspects of it. For
more introductory material, see (Hohwy 2013; Clark 2013; 2016; Tani 2016; Wiese and Metzinger 2017).
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According to the predictive coding algorithm (Rao and Ballard 1999; Huang and Rao
2011), these predictions are then contrasted with the actual sensory states, typically, but not
exclusively, by subtraction (Spratling 2017). Their comparison yields a signal known as
prediction error, which is used to revise predictions, so as to minimize the incoming error.7 In
this way, the system searches for a global minimum of error which, when reached, inverts the
generative model, as it maps the incoming input (e.g. orange retinal images) onto its most
likely cause (e.g. carrots). Importantly, as the cause thus selected approximates an exact
Bayesian posterior, PP seems to cast perception as an inferential process performed by means
of prediction error minimization.
A similar description holds for action, or active inference.8 The basic idea behind it is that
brains are skewed towards a set of (multimodal) sensory expectations. The error relative to
the proprioceptive facets of these predictions is then used to trigger spinal reflexes (Friston
2011; Adams et al. 2013), so as to bring about the predicted interoceptive sensory states, and
eventually encounter the whole multimodal prediction. Active inference is thus a process of
error minimization in which the predicted sensory states are brought about through
movement (e.g. Namikawa et al. 2011); thereby bringing about the evidence in favor of one’s
generative model (Hohwy 2016; 2020)
Importantly, the predictions triggering active inference are always multimodal, and
non-proprioceptive predictions can sometimes (more or less directly) drive active inference
too (see Pio-Lopez et al. 2016). In fact, if, as PP suggests, the only function of the brain is
that of keeping prediction error at a minimum over time (see Friston 2009; 2010), it is hard to
see how these predictions can be but multimodal. A brain unable to predict the visual
consequences of a saccadic eye movement, for instance, would be unable to effectively
8 This sacrifices precision to ease of exposition: active inference is also responsible for changes of bodily states
that are not actions (see Seth and Friston 2016).
7 Prediction error is often weighted according to the expected signal-to-noise ratio of the data. Roughly, this is
how PP accounts for attention (see Feldman and Friston 2010).
2007b).
Forthcoming on Synthese. Please refer to the published version: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03304-3 6/51
minimize prediction error, as each saccade would bring about unpredicted (i.e. error
inducing) visual input. This immediately connects generative models to sensorimotor
contingencies.
Sensorimotor contingencies are law-like relations capturing how the sensory states of a
system evolve, given a system’s movements and the relevant features of a system’s sensorium
and environment (O’Regan and Noë 2001; O’Regan 2011; Brette 2016). Approaching an
object, for instance, will make its retinal image expand; whereas backing away from it will
make the retinal image contract.9 Although theorists introducing sensorimotor contingencies
never specified what sort of structures could realize a system’s knowledge of sensorimotor
contingencies, generative models appear to be ideal candidates (Seth 2014; Pezzulo et al.
2017; Vásquez 2019; see also Hemion 2016; Laflaquiere 2017).
To briefly see why, consider the role of forward models in motor control. Forward models
are special purpose generative models, tasked with converting motor commands into the
predictable sensory consequences of movement. Clearly, to function properly, a forward
model must encode the relevant sensorimotor contingencies, as its role is precisely that of
predicting how bodily movements alter sensory states (see Maye and Engel 2013: 425;
Pezzulo 2011).
In traditional theories of motor control, forward models work in tandem with inverse
models, converting goal states into motor commands. A copy of the motor command thus
computed is sent to the forward model, to estimate the expected sensory consequences of
movement. The estimate is needed for a variety of reasons. For instance, it allows the agent to
control and correct actions on-line, in spite of the fact that the reafferent signal is noisy and
delayed. It also allows the agent to proactively adjust in regard to the foreseeable
consequences of its own actions (Franklin and Wolpert 2011). Forward models can also act as
9 Provided, of course, that the moving system has eyes, that there is light in the environment, and that the object
is still. These are examples of the “relevant features” of the system’s sensorium and the environment.
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filters, allowing the agent to ignore the predictable, and thus uninformative, “bits” of the
reafferent signal (Blackmore, Firth and Wolpert 1999).
According to PP, however, there is only the forward model. More precisely, there is only
one integrated generative model busy predicting the motor-dependent sensory states the agent
“desires to encounter”10; the motor plant itself will then bring them about through movement
(Friston 2011; Pickering and Clark 2014). Generative models able to perform active
inference, thus, appear as ideal candidates to implement an agent’s sensorimotor mastery, as
they must encode parsimonious descriptions of sensorimotor loops (Baltieri and Buckely
2019; Tschantz et al. 2020).11
Inferentialist and representationalist interpretations of PP conceive generative models as
structural representations: vehicles representing their targets in virtue of the structural
similarity holding between them. If they are on the right track, and my presentation of PP is
correct, it thus follows that the structures instantiating our sensorimotor mastery are
representational vehicles. But what does it take to be one?
3 - Some necessary features of representational vehicles
Here, I expose some of the theoretical commitments endorsed by inferentialist and
representationalist interpretations of PP. Each commitment spells out a condition that,
according to these views, an item must satisfy in order to qualify as a representational
vehicle. Hence, they jointly provide a minimal set of criteria to determine whether the
physical structures instantiating generative models qualify as representational vehicles.
11 Here, I mainly focus on perception and action, ignoring PP explanations of other cognitive processes (see
Friston 2009; 2010; Spratling 2016). One, however, might fear that an agent’s sensorimotor mastery alone will
not support cognitive processing beyond simple sensorimotor coordinations. Computationally speaking, there
are some reasons to believe that sensorimotor mastery can support more “thought-like” cognitive processes (e.g.
Hay et al. 2018; Le Hir et al. 2018), but that evidence is not conclusive. However, within the PP literature,
“thought like” cognitive processes are typically supposed to be supported by the offline functioning of the
machinery responsible for perception and action (e.g. Tani 2016; Pezzulo 2017). Thus, it seems to me, the image
of PP I just painted is not significantly removed from the official one.
10 Strictly speaking, these are the sensory states the agent predicts to encounter, given its priors; see (Friston,
Samothrakis and Montague 2012).
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3.1 - Vehicles can be assigned distal and determinate content
Representations are type-identified by their contents, which are both distal and
determinate (e.g. Egan 2012: 256). Representations “are about” well specified worldly
targets, rather than the proximal conditions by means of which these targets are causally
encountered. Hence, representational vehicles can always be assigned a determinate and
distal content, given a theory of content.
Here, the relevant senses of “distality” and “determinacy” are the ones at play in the
horizontal disjunction/stopping problem (Dretske 1986; Godfrey-Smith 1989; Neander 2017).
A correct theory of content must allow us to say that a vehicle V represents one, and only
one, target T, rather than the disjunction of two or more targets (T or T*). This is
determinacy. Moreover, a vehicle must represent a target appropriately “out there”. Cognitive
agents represent objects and states of affairs of the distal world, rather than the more
proximal states of affairs causally mediating one’s encounter with the distal world, such as
the states of one’s transducers. Two distinct reasons support this assumption.
The first is empirical adequacy: cognitive scientists, by and large, do ascribe determinate
and distal content to representations. A neuropsychologist, for instance, might claim that a
given pattern of activation of the fusiform face area represents faces. I know of no
neuropsychologist claiming that such a pattern of activation represents (faces or face-like
conformations); or that it represents face-shaped retinal images. Hence, to be consistent with
the normal conduct of cognitive science, philosophical theories of content need to deliver
determinate and distal contents.12
The second reason is conceptual. Representations must be able to misrepresent. But
disjunctive (i.e. non determinate) and/or proximal contents do not allow for misrepresentation
12 Importantly, this passage and the following should not be taken to imply that all currently existing theories of
content do not have the conceptual resources needed to assign determinate and distal contents. Indeed, at least
some theories of content seem to have the resources to do so (e.g. Neander 2017: Ch. 7 and 9).
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to occur. To see why, consider Fodor’s (1987: 99-102) crude causal theory, according to
which a vehicle V represents whichever target causes its tokening. If dogs cause the tokening
of V, then V represents dogs. Suppose now a sheep causes a “wild” tokening of V. We would
like to say that V misrepresents the sheep as a dog. Yet, the crude causal theory prevents us
from saying so. If V represents whatever causes its tokening, and its tokening is caused by
dogs or by sheep, then V represents (dogs or sheep), and tokens of V caused by sheep are not
misrepresentations. Further, it could be argued that the tokening of V is not really caused by
dogs (or sheep), but by some more proximal conditions, such as quadruped-shaped retinal
images. Again, in this case, it seems that “wild” tokenings of V do not misrepresent dogs as
sheep. Rather, they correctly represent some more proximal condition, which happens to be
disjunctively caused by both dogs and sheep.
Notice that although the horizontal disjunction problem ties them together, distality and
determinacy are two logically independent requirements, which can independently fail to
obtain (see Artiga and Sebastián 2018; Roche and Sober 2019). A theory of content can be in
trouble both because it does not provide appropriately determinate content (as in the
“vertical” disjunction problem, see Fodor 1990) or because it provides determinate, but only
proximal, content.
Thus presented, distality and determinacy seem two requirements that a theory of content
must satisfy; and, traditionally, they have been articulated in that way. Their traditional
articulation is roughly as follows: representational vehicles have determinate and distal
contents. If a given theory of content C does not assign them determinate and distal contents;
then C is wrong and ought to be rejected. Notice the argument assumes representationalism,
and assesses theories of content based on their ability to satisfy distality and determinacy.
Yet, the issues concerning distality and determinacy allow to formulate an argument
working the other way around; namely, by assuming that a given theory of content is correct,
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one can assess whether a candidate vehicle really qualifies as a vehicle, by checking whether
it is assigned an appropriately determinate and distal content by the theory. In fact, a correct
theory of content supposedly assigns determinate and distal contents to all and only
representational vehicles. Therefore, if given such a theory a candidate vehicle is not assigned
an appropriately distal and determinate content, then the candidate vehicle really is no
vehicle. If it were, it would have been assigned a determinate and distal content.
I take this to be the first necessary feature of vehicles of content: vehicles of content must
be assigned determinate and distal contents, given a correct theory of content. Clearly, this
procedure presupposes a theory of content, whose correctness has to be assumed. In the
following, I grant representationalists and inferentialist reading of PP their theory of content
of choice. I examine it in the next subsection, showing that it imposes further constraints on
the properties of candidate vehicles.
3.2 - Exploitable structural similarity
Inferentialist and representationalist accounts of PP argue that generative models are
structural representations: vehicles representing their targets in virtue of their exploitable
structural similarity (Gładziejewski 2016; Kiefer and Hohwy 2018; 2019, Williams 2018;
Wiese 2018). The relevant theory of content they endorse is thus based on two ingredients: (i)
structural similarity and (ii) exploitability. I unpack them in turn.
Structural similarity is often unpacked as homomorphism (Wiese 2018; Kiefer and Hohwy
2018) or “second order structural resemblance”, which is a partial homomorphism
(Gładziejewski 2016). Here, I adhere to the second reading. This is because second order
structural resemblances are easier to obtain than homomorphisms, and so sticking to it allows
me to provide a more charitable reconstruction of inferentialist and representationalist
readings of PP.
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On this reading, a system V bears a structural similarity to a system T if, and only if, there
is a one-to-one mapping from at least some constituents vx of V onto at least some
constituents tx of T such that an identical abstract pattern of relations among constituents is
preserved on both sides of the mapping.13 Several clarifications seem needed.
First, structural representations are defined in terms of vehicles representing a target in
virtue of the (exploitable) structural similarity that ties them together. Structural similarity is
thus a relational property of vehicles. Hence, candidate vehicles must be structurally similar
to their targets. Notice that the relevant structural similarity partially constitutes the relevant
content of the vehicle. Hence, to secure distality and determinacy, the relevant structural
similarity must hold between a candidate vehicle and some appropriately distal and well
determined target.
Secondly, both the vehicles and the targets of structural representations must have some
internal degree of complexity: they are made up by constituents among which certain
relations hold. I will denote constituents using uncapitalized letters with a subscript (e.g. vx is
an arbitrary constituent of a vehicle V, ta is a specific constituent of a target T).
Lastly, notice that what is mirrored on both sides of the mapping is a pattern of relations,
not a relation. This means that the relations holding among the constituents of V and T may
differ. Only their patterns need to be identical. Suppose, for instance, that V is constituted,
among other, by three constituents ordered in the triplet (va, vb, vc) by their relative
magnitude; whereas T is constituted, among other, by three constituents ordered in the tripled
(ta, tb, tc) by their relative frequency. If constituents with identical subscripts map one to one
onto each other, V and T are structurally similar, in spite of the fact that no common relation
holds among their constituents.14
Structural similarity alone is clearly insufficient to determine content. Structural
14 Notice also, for the sake of clarity, that V and T need not have any property in common.
13 Here, I’m trading precision for ease of exposition. See (O’Brien and Opie 2004: 11) for the canonical formal
definition of second order structural resemblance.
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similarities do not have the logical properties of representations (Goodman 1969) and are
extremely cheap to come by; so cheap that any two arbitrary systems can be said to be
structurally similar in some regard (McLendon 1955: 89-90; Shea 2018: 112). This is why the
relevant vehicle-target structural similarity must be exploitable.
Exploitability is canonically defined as the conjunction of two requirements (Shea 2018:
120). First, the relevant relations holding among vehicle constituents must have some
systematic downstream effect on the computational operations of the system in which the
vehicle is tokened. Secondly, both the constituents of T and their relations must be “of
significance” to the system. Here, significance should be unpacked in terms of the system’s
task functions. Roughly put, task functions are the outputs that a system produces in response
to a range of inputs in a range of different conditions and that the system is supposed to
produce, in virtue of the system’s history of selection, individual learning, or explicit (human)
design (see Shea 2018: Ch. 3).
Exploitable structural similarity naturally combines with distality and determinacy,
yielding a further requirement on representational vehicles. A candidate vehicle really is a
vehicle only if it is assigned a determinate and distal content in virtue of the exploitable
structural similarity it bears to a determinate and distal target.
3.3 - Mathematical contents constrain representational contents
A further constraint must be taken into account. According to representationalist and
inferentialist accounts of PP, the representational (distal and determinate) content of a vehicle
must at least cohere with its mathematical content (Wiese 2016; 2018). Thus, mathematical
content constrains representational content.
Mathematical content is a kind of narrow content which is ascribed to vehicles in virtue of
the relevant computational description that the system satisfies; that is, in virtue of the
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mathematical functions the system computes (Egan 2014; 2018). Consider for instance how
prediction error is computed. Saying that prediction error is computed by subtracting the
values of expected and actually received sensory signals means that there is a robust mapping
between vehicles and numerical values, such that, anytime the vehicle of the prediction signal
maps onto value x and the vehicle of the incoming signal maps onto value y, the prediction
error signal produced will map onto value (x-y). In this example, the numerical values of x, y
and (x-y) are the mathematical contents carried by the vehicles.
The idea that mathematical contents must constrain representational content is attractive
because we can explain the functioning of PP systems in two ways. One explanation
leverages the mathematical tools of computational theory. Explanations of this kind are
provided, for instance, when we say that prediction error encodes the difference between
predicted and actual signal, computed by subtraction. The other explanation relies instead on
the familiar lexicon of representational contents. According to this kind of explanation, for
instance, prediction error represents what was missing from the original prediction; that is,
the unexpected features displayed by a perceptual take (e.g. Clark 2015b: 5-6). Given that
both accounts are literal explanations detailing how the PP machinery works, they must be at
least coherent with each other. For this reason, the assignment of mathematical contents can
place some constraints on the assignment of representational contents.15
But which constraints does it place? The literature is not explicit on this matter. Wiese
(2018: 209) only explicitly states that mathematical contents pose “strong constraints” on
representational contents, which get stronger as computational theories grow (Wiese 2016:
724-725).16 It seems, however, that the constraints mathematical contents place on
16 A somewhat similar idea seems to be endorsed by (Ramstead, Friston and Hipòlito 2020), even if I doubt that
Ramstead and colleagues' notion of “representation” is the same notion of representation used in this essay.
15 This is a significant departure from Egan’s (2014; 2018) account of mathematical content. On her account,
mathematical contents do not constrain ascription of representational content. Moreover, Egan claims that
representational content cannot be naturalized. Conversely, inferentialist and representationalist accounts of PP
endorse naturalism about representational content.
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representational contents are strong enough to at least partially determine representational
contents. I list some examples below.
Wiese (216: 733) claims that computational models of active inference determine at least
some representational contents, as they interpret the signals reaching the motor plant as
conveying predicted sensory states rather than motor commands. But predicted sensory states
and motor commands are not numerical values, hence they are not mathematical contents.
Rather, they are representational contents, which, on Wiese’s view, “fall off” directly from the
computational rendering of the theory. In a further publication, Wiese (2018: 215-218)
suggests that the representational content of a generative model includes everything that can
be described by the same set of equations which describe the model computational behavior.
Again, it seems that here too Wiese is suggesting that mathematical contents at least partially
determine representational contents. And it seems to me that Wiese is not alone in endorsing
this view.
Gładziejewski (2016: 573) argues that the relevant structural similarity holding between
generative models and their targets should be construed in terms of the prior probabilities of
certain events and the likelihoods of sensory states, given external events. Prior probabilities
and likelihoods are mathematical contents - they are numerical values upon which (some) PP
systems compute. Yet, in Gładziejewski's view, they also partially determine the relevant
structural similarity; and so the representational content of a generative model.
Clark (2015c: 2) and Williams (2018a: 162-163) claim that, in PP models, the
naturalization of content falls within the scope of computational neuroscience. In their view,
what needs to be done to naturalize content just is detailing the computational functioning of
generative models, showing how such mechanisms “get a grip” on the world (see Hutto and
Myin 2020: 93-97 for further discussion). Kiefer and Hohwy (2018; 2019) go as far as
proposing a mathematical measure of misrepresentation.
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Due to space limitations, I cannot examine any of these proposals in detail. Nevertheless,
they are here worth mentioning, to show that representationalist and inferentialist accounts of
PP really are committed to the claim that there is a significant interplay between
mathematical and representational content; so significant, indeed, that in many cases
representational contents seem to derive, more or less immediately, from mathematical ones.
Notice, importantly, that this is entirely compatible with the claim that representational
contents are determined by exploitable structural similarities. In fact, the relevant structural
similarity itself might be visible only under some quite specific mathematical description
(e.g. Gładziejewski 2016; Wiese 2018: 215-217).
Taking stock: according to inferentialist and representationalist accounts of PP,
representational vehicles have a determinate and distal content, which they acquire in virtue
of an exploitable structural similarity with an appropriate (i.e. determinate and distal) target.
Moreover, the representational (distal and determinate) content of these vehicles is at least
coherent with (if not more or less directly determined by) their mathematical content: the
numerical values they must represent to allow the computational operations defined over
them to take place.
In the next two sections, I will argue that no component of a generative model seems to
satisfy that description. Hence, given these theoretical commitments, generative models will
naturally appear as non-representational structures instantiating a system’s sensorimotor
knowledge.
4 - The structures instantiating generative models do not appear to be
representational vehicles
I split this section into two sub-sections. The first introduces a minimal generative model
able to perform active inference. The second examines it, arguing that none of its components
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qualifies as a representational vehicle, given the requirements highlighted above.
4.1 - A minimal generative model capable of active inference
According to PP, generative models are physically instantiated by patterns of neural
activation and axonal connections (Friston 2005: 819-820; Buckley et al. 2017: 57). So,
patterns of activation and connections are the candidate vehicles of generative models.
Hence, connectionist systems are ideally suited to examine the representational commitments
of PP (Dołega 2017; Kiefer and Hohwy 2018; 2019).
Consider the network Bovet (2007) engineered as a control system for robotic agents,
enabling them to display a variety of behaviors involving simple sensorimotor coordinations,
such as returning to a “nest” after having explored the environment (Bovet 2006), smoothly
moving using different gaits (Iida and Bovet 2009) or successfully navigating simple T-mazes
(Bovet and Pfeiffer 2005a; 2005b).
The network is a series of homogeneously connected artificial neural networks, one for
each sensory modality of the robotic agent (“motor” modality included). Each net consists of
the following three input populations (ending in “S”) and two output populations (ending in
“C”):
(CS) or current state population, receiving input from the sensor or effector of one
modality.
(DS) or delayed state population, receiving the same input of (CS) after a small delay.
(VS) or virtual state population, receiving input from all other nets.
(SC) or state change population, receiving input from (CS) and (DS).
(VC) or virtual change population, receiving input to (CS) and (VS), and sending output
to all other (VS)s.
The number of neurons of each population varies across modalities, but remains constant
within each modality. This allows the various populations of a single modality to be “copies”
of each other. In particular, (DS)s and (VS)s can be “copies” of (CS)s; whereas (VC)s can
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“mimic” (SC)s. Within each net, the connections running from input to output populations are
not trained, and have opposite weights. Moreover, these connections are neuronwise: the nth
neuron of each input population projects only to the nth neuron of the relevant output
population. Thus, the patterns of activation of the output populations are defined as the
neuron-to-neuron subtraction of activity patterns of the corresponding input populations.
Conversely, connections between nets are trained, and involve all neurons of the (VC)
population of a modality and all the neurons of the (VS)s of all other modalities.
To understand how the network works, consider first (CS)s: they encode, in each modality,
the state of the relevant sensor. In the visual modality, for instance, (CS) will reflect the
image captured by a camera. (DS)s do the same, but after a small delay: in the visual
modality, (DS)’s activity reflects the image captured by the camera one timestep ago. (CS)s
and (DS)s jointly determine the activation pattern of (SC)s, which thus reflect how the
sensory state has changed in a timestep.17 Continuing with the previous example, (SC) in the
visual modality captures how the camera image changed during the delay; for instance,
whether it expanded or contracted.
Consider now any two arbitrary modalities a and b: there will be patterns of co-activation
between the neurons in (SC) of modality a and those in (CS) of modality b. For instance,
when visual (SC) encodes the expansion of the camera image, the motor (CS) is typically
encoding the fact that the motors are pushing forward. These patterns of coactivation are then
used to train, in a purely Hebbian fashion, the connections running from (VC) of modality a
to (VS) of modality b. If the nth neuron in (SC) of modality a and the mth neuron in (CS) of
modality b fire together, the nth neuron in (VC) of modality a and the mth neuron in (VS) of
modality b wire together.
This allows the information flowing from (VC)s to (VS)s to be transformed in a way so as
17 Notice that each change in sensory state is always due to the behavior of the robot or, during the learning
period, the fact that an experimenter “moved” the robot’s body around.
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to induce, in (VS)s, a pattern of activation that corresponds to the sensory state that modality
typically occupies as the other modalities change in a given way; that is, the sensory state
expected, given the activity in all (SC)s.18 Thus, the activity of (VS) estimates (or predicts) a
sensory state, given the motor-dependent changes of sensory states in all other modalities.
And, in fact, the connections from all (VC)s to all (VS)s constitute a simple generative
model, which predicts the sensory states expected, given the robot’s activity. In this way, they
constitute a simple generative model instantiating an agent’s knowledge of its relevant
sensorimotor contingencies: they allow the network to predict the incoming stimulation,
given the robot’s movements.
Recall now that the connections running from (CS)s and (VS)s to (VC)s are not trained,
and have opposite weights. This means that the pattern of activity in each (VC) will reflect
the difference between current and predicted sensory states, which is just prediction error,
computed in the simplest possible way. Prediction error is then forwarded to all (VS)s,
enabling them to update their estimate just as PP requires.19
Notice further that in the motor modality, (VS) directly controls the motors. In this way,
the robot will move so as to bring about the sensory states the network expects. The robot’s
behavior is thus driven directly by the network’s motor predictions, and indirectly by the
ensemble of expected sensory states. This is because the input to the motor (VS) just is
prediction error from all other modalities. Thus, the robots will act if, and only if, the network
needs to minimize prediction error in some modalities, and the robot will act so as to bring
about the sensory stimulation the network expects, thereby minimizing prediction error in all
modalities.20 In this way, Bovet’s networks qualify as minimal PP systems, able to “actively
20 This is because the (VC) in each modality effectively “mimics” the (SC) of that modality. Thus, the activity of
(VC)s elicit in motor (VS) a pattern of activity corresponding to the motor state expected, given that change in
sensory states. In this way, the robot will act so as to minimize that error.
19 Notice that albeit here all nets are homogeneously connected (and so there is no hierarchy) PP allows for
horizontal (i.e. within level) message passing of error, see (Friston 2008:16). Intriguingly, such an horizontal
message-passing is rarely implemented in robotic models inspired by PP, see (Ciria et al. 2021).
18 To be clear, (SC)s do not project on (VS)s. Only (VC)s do. But since within each modality each population
has the same number of neurons, the (VC) of each modality can mimic the (SC) of that modality.
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infer” the sensory states expected in all modalities.
Before I move forward, let me stress that it is essential not to confuse networks and robots.
Only networks literally are PP systems, generating and minimizing prediction errors. And
only networks host connections and units exhibiting activation patterns. So, only networks are
candidate vehicles of generative models. This is important because Bovet describes networks
and robots differently. Robots are described distally, in terms of interactions with the
environment (e.g. navigating a T-Maze). But networks are described only proximally, without
any reference to environmental states of affairs. For instance: “The essence of this neural
architecture [...] is the following. 1) All signals of the sensors and motors the robot is
equipped with are represented through the activity of artificial neurons.” (Bovet 2007: 12,
emphasis added). The point motivates Bovet’s research: he aims at showing that coherent and
intelligent behaviors can be enabled by networks that only learn correlations between the
states of the robots’ sensors and motors (ibidem).21
Now, to see this simple generative model in action, consider the following experiment in
which the network enabled a form of “phonotaxis”22 comparable with that of female crickets
(Bovet 2007: 79-105). When a female cricket hears the song of a conspecific, she turns in the
direction of the sound source and approaches the male to mate. The turning behavior of the
cricket, however, generates optic flow in the opposite direction23; and optic flows tend to
trigger the cricket’s optomotor response: a simple reflex that tries to correct for the visual
flow, re-orienting the cricket in her original position. Clearly, in order for the cricket to reach
her mate, her optomotor response needs to be inhibited. Empirical studies suggest that the
inhibition is carried out through reafference cancellation: a simple forward model predicts the
23 That is, when the cricket turns left, the optic flow optic flow moves to the right. This is a simple sensorimotor
contingence.
22 Due to the robotic hardware employed, “phonotaxis” really was phototaxis (i.e. the sound source really is a
light source). This is why “phonotaxis”, “auditory modality” and “sound source” will appear under scare quotes
in the text.
21 Many thanks to an anonymous reviewer for having advised me to be clearer on this point from the onset.
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visual flow caused by the cricket reorientation, and that prediction is used to suppress the
optomotor reflex (e.g. Payne, Hedwig and Webb 2010; Webb 2019).
Bovet’s experiment was simple. First, he created a network mounted on a “cricket robot”,
possessing four modalities: an “auditory” modality, a visual modality, a motor modality and a
battery level modality, which equipped the robot with a minimal form of visceroception. The
network was then trained (by making the robot interact with its environment) so that it could
learn the relevant sensorimotor contingencies. Crucially, each time the robot reached the
“auditory source”, the battery level was increased.
After training, the experimental session began. The network’s visceroceptive (VS) was
increased; and the mismatch between visceroceptive (CS) and (VS) propagated prediction
error. Since increases of battery level highly correlated with certain patterns of activation of
the “auditory modality” (recall, the battery level increased anytime the robot was in
proximity of the “auditory source”), the “auditory” (VS) instantiated those patterns. The
mismatch between “auditory” (CS) and (VS) was then propagated to all other modalities.
Hence, the network “expected” the patterns of stimulation generated by movements towards
the “auditory source”: a certain kind of motor activation, and the corresponding optic flow.
The error relative to these expectations was then minimized through active inference; that is,
by making the robot reach for the “auditory source”.
Then, the (VS) of the motor modality was injected with some noise, and the robot’s
“phonotactic” behavior was tested under two conditions. In the first, the synaptic coupling
between motor and visual modality was removed; whereas in the second it was left
untouched. In the first condition, the robot was often unable to display the “phonotactic”
behavior. This is because the noisy activity in motor (VS) forced the robot to take sudden
curves, and, given that the visual and motor modalities were disconnected, the visual
modality was unable to predict the corresponding optic flow. This generated visual prediction
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error, which was propagated in the network, triggering the optomotor reflex, thereby
hindering “phonotaxis”. The competition between “phonotactic” and optomotor behaviors
can be seen in (Bovet 2007: 90, figures 5-7): the robot’s trajectories exhibit the zig-zag
typical of two competing orienting reflexes. Yet, when the synaptic coupling between motor
and visual modalities was re-established, the visual modality was able to predict the incoming
optic flow. Thus, no optomotor reflex ensued, and the robot swiftly reached for the “sound
source”.24 Hence, the synaptic coupling between visual and motor modality constituted a
simple forward model25; and, more generally, the connection between various modality
constituted a simple generative model, enabling the network to predict the incoming input and
to make some of those predictions come true through active inference. Notice further that the
network qualifies as a genuine forward model, rather than merely as a system exhibiting a
simple compensatory bias. In fact, its predictions are targeted to enhance or suppress
behaviorally relevant stimulation, are modulated so as to match the incoming feedback and
are able to adapt in an experience-dependent manner (see Weber 2004).26
4.2 - The network hosts no representational vehicle
It is now possible to check whether the connections or the activity patterns of the network
qualify as representational vehicles given the theoretical commitments endorsed by
inferentialist and representationalist readings of PP.
Consider first patterns of activity. In the connectionist literature it is standardly assumed
that patterns of activity of the hidden layers are representational vehicles (e.g. Goodfellow et
al. 2016: Ch. 15). But the network has no hidden layers. It is thus doubtful whether we should
26 On experience-dependent adaptability, see (Bovet and Pfeiffer 2005a; 2005b).
25 Notice, importantly, that I’m here using the term “forward model” just to denote the fact that such a synaptic
coupling allowed the network to predict the sensory consequences of the movements of the robot. I’m not
implying that the synaptic coupling estimated the sensory consequences of behavior from motor commands. In
fact, there are no motor commands in such an architecture, and the robot’s behavior is directly controlled by the
network’s sensory predictions, just as active inference prescribes.
24 Strikingly, a similar synaptic coupling enabling optic flow predictions has been observed in mammalian
brains, and it nicely fits a number of theoretical predictions coming from PP, see (Leinweber et al. 2017).
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consider its activity patterns as candidate representational vehicles.27
Suppose we should. Are patterns of activity structurally similar to relevant environmental
targets? As far as I can see, the answer is in principle positive: structural similarities are
cheap to come by and can even be arbitrarily defined (Shea 2018: 112-113). Hence, it is
extremely likely that the patterns of activation of the network will turn out to be structurally
similar to at least some environmental target. The relevant point is thus whether these
structural similarities will be exploitable.
Recall: exploitability is the conjunction of two requirements (Shea 2018: 120). First, the
system must be systematically sensitive to the relations holding among vehicle constituents.
Secondly, the relevant target must be of significance to the system; that is, it must be relevant
to the system’s task functions: the outputs the system has been stabilized or purposefully
designed to produce. As Bovet’s networks are artificially designed, the designer dictates their
task functions, thereby (partially) determining which structural similarities are exploitable.
However, Bovet defines the function of his networks in squarely proximal terms. For
instance, he states that (CS)s are, by design, “supposed to” produce a pattern of activity that
corresponds to the state of one sensor or motor. As he writes: “In the visual modality for
instance, the activity of each neuron corresponds to the brightness of a pixel in the camera
image” (Bovet 2006: 528, italics added). Similarly, he states (SC)s have been designed to
reflect how the sensory inputs have changed in a timestep. Equally proximal descriptions are
in fact given for each neural population.
It thus seems that, by design, the network’s task functions target only proximal states, and
therefore only proximal states will be of significance to it. But exploitable structural
27 As a reviewer noticed, it is intuitive to define hidden layers as layers which are neither input nor output layers.
Given this definition, (VS)s seem to be hidden layers: they do not receive inputs from the sensors (so they are
not input layers) nor forward output to effectors (so they are not output layers). So, why am I claiming the
networks have no hidden layer? Mainly, because this is how Bovet characterizes them: “The network does not
contain any so-called ‘hidden’ layer of inter-neurons” (Bovet 2007: 29). Perhaps it could be argued that both the
reviewer and Bovet are right: if we focus on single modalities, then (VS)s naturally appear as input layers. Yet,
when focusing on the entire network, (VS)s are more naturally considered as hidden layers. However, as far as I
can see, granting (VS)s the status of hidden layers does not impact my argument.
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similarities can hold only between candidate vehicles and targets that are of significance to
the system. Thus, if exploitable structural similarities are used to determine the content of the
candidate vehicles under scrutiny (i.e. patterns of activation), their content can only be
proximal. But then the candidate vehicles fail to satisfy distality. Conversely, if we assign
candidate vehicles distal targets, they will fail to satisfy exploitability. It thus seems that here
candidate vehicles cannot satisfy distality and exploitable structural similarity in conjunction.
The same holds if instead of single patterns of activations we focus on the entire activation
space (e.g. Churchland 2012), as focusing on the entire activation space will not change the
task functions of the networks. Thus, the entire activation space can bear an exploitable
structural similarity only to proximal stimuli (or, perhaps more appropriately, the space of
possible proximal stimuli). As a result, it fails to satisfy either distality or exploitability just
as single activation patterns.
What if, as a reviewer asks, we focus on the robots’ task functions instead? Since the
robots’ behavior is distally characterized, it seems legitimate to expect the robots’ task
functions to be distally characterized (i.e. “long-armed”) too. That would solve the problem
of distality just raised. However, albeit Bovet describes the robots’ behaviors in distal terms,
he never assigns distal functions to them. In fact, he explicitly states that his robots have no
purpose (Bovet 2007: 4-9). His aim is that of studying: “artificial systems endowed with a
self-developing dynamics, yet without any particular task or motivation” (ibidem: 8,
emphasis added). Given that robots are artificial systems, and so their functions are
determined by their designer, it seems correct to conclude that Bovet’s robots have just no
task function, long-armed or otherwise.
Couldn’t perhaps the patterns of activation have acquired some distally characterized
function through the network’s individual learning history? A negative answer seems
warranted for two distinct reasons. First, albeit some philosophers do allow individual
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learning histories to dictate functions, the scope of the claim is restricted to supervised forms
of learning involving some sort of feedback (e.g. Dretske 1988; Shea 2018: 59-62). But
Bovet’s networks learn in a purely unsupervised manner, and no feedback is involved.
Moreover, functions are typically understood as the upshot of processes of selection, in which
certain features or traits are selected over competing features or traits in virtue of their effects.
Hebbian learning, however, is not a process of selection. Hence, it cannot confer functions
(Garson 2012).28 Mutatis mutandis, the same reasoning seems to apply to entire robotic
agents.
Maybe we should assign content to single activation patterns in a different way. Wiese
(2018: 219-223) has in fact recently suggested a different procedure to do so. In his view, the
(generative) model as a whole represents the causal structure of the world in virtue of the
exploitable structural similarity holding between the two. However, he adds that the contents
of individual patterns of activation should be determined by looking at the statistical
dependencies holding between them and their worldly causes. Relying on Eliasmith’s theory
of content, Wiese suggests that the target of a neuronal response is the set of causally related
events upon which the neural response statistically depends the most under all stimulus
conditions (see Eliasmith 2000: 34). That is, a neuronal response represents the events that,
on average, make its tokening most likely. Does this suggestion allow the candidate vehicles
under scrutiny to meet distality and exploitable structural similarity? The answer seems to me
negative for two reasons.
First, resorting to Eliasmith’s theory of content seems redundant. Wiese (2018: 219-222)
intends to use it to assign contents to individual neuronal responses, which he takes to be
“proper parts” (i.e. vehicle constituents) of the generative model. He also maintains that the
generative model is, as a whole, structurally similar to the causal structure of the world.
28 Notice also that PP only requires Hebbian forms of learning, see (Bogacz 2017). Thus, given that Hebbian
learning is not a selectionist process, it could be argued that no PP system can acquire functions through
individual learning.
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However, in structural representations, the way in which each vehicle constituent participates
to the structural similarity is already sufficient to determine its content (Cummins 1996: 96;
Shea 2018: 125; Kiefer and Hohwy 2018: 2391). Consider, for instance, a map. As a whole,
the map (V) is structurally similar to a target territory (T). This is because V’s constituents
(va...vn) map one to one onto T’s constituents (ta...tn) in a way such that the same pattern of
spatial relations holds among both (va...vn) and (ta...tn). But if this is the case, then it is entirely
correct to say that va represents ta and vb represents tb and so on. Since individual vehicle
constituents acquire content in virtue of the role they play in the overall structural similarity,
there seems to be no need of resorting to Eliasmith’s theory of content.
Secondly, suppose that content is assigned to vehicle constituents as Eliasmith’s theory of
content suggests. Will the contents thus assigned be consistent with the ones assigned by the
relevant structural similarity? If yes, then resorting to Eliamith's theory of content adds
nothing to what structural similarity already provides. But if not, then there are at least some
cases in which a vehicle constituent vx represents both tx by structural similarity and ty by
Eliasmith’s theory. But then vx fails determinacy, because its content is disjunctive. In fact,
given that vx represents tx, its conditions of satisfaction obtain whenever tx is the case. And,
given it also represents ty, its conditions of satisfaction obtain whenever ty is the case. Hence,
vx will misrepresent if, and only if, both tx and ty are not the case. But these are the conditions
of satisfaction of a vehicle representing (tx or ty).
To restore determinacy, one needs to deny either that vx represents tx or that it represents ty.
Denying that vx represents ty rules out the contribution provided by Eliasmith’s theory, which
again is left with no role to play. But one cannot rule out that vx represents tx either, as that
would deny that V, of which vx is a constituent, is a structural representation. In fact, the
statement “if V is a structural representation of T, then each constituent vx of V represents the
constituent tx of T onto which it maps” is correct. So, by saying that vx is not a representation
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of tx one denies the consequent of a true statement. But if the consequent of a true statement
is false, then the antecedent must be false too. Therefore, if vx does not represent tx, then V is
not a structural representation of T.29
Summarizing: patterns of activation do not seem to bear any exploitable structural
similarity to distal targets. Hence, if their content is determined by exploitable structural
similarity, then distality does not obtain. Conversely, if their content is not proximal, then
their content is not determined by an exploitable structural similarity. Appealing to a different
content determination procedure appears to deepen the problem. I thus conclude that patterns
of activation are not representational vehicles.
Now, what about the connections? As distality has thus far been particularly pressing, it
offers a natural starting point: do connections have distal content? The answer seems
negative.
To begin with, what should their content be? Connections encode all a network learns (e.g.
Rogers and McClelland 2004). But all Bovet’s networks learn is to predict the states of the
sensors and motors of the robots they control. This seems definitely proximal content.
Computationally speaking, connections are also trained in a simple Hebbian fashion. At each
time step, the way in which the weight of a connection is modified is provided by a function
that takes as arguments patterns of co-activation between the neurons in (CS) and (SC) and
the learning rate (see e.g. Bovet 2007: 26-29). The mathematical content of these connections
(i.e. their weight value) is thus exclusively determined by factors lying inside the system. If
ascriptions of mathematical contents constrain ascriptions of representational contents, it
seems that, in these cases, the mathematical contents constrain our ascriptions of
representational contents in favor of proximal contents.
These arguments are not conclusive. So, I concede we might be able to assign distal
29 An anonymous reviewer raised a challenge to the line of argument developed here. I discuss it in section 5.2
to avoid having to place a long digression here. But the reader can read it now, if they so wish.
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contents to connections. But will it be assigned in virtue of an exploitable structural
similarity? I believe the answer is again negative. This is because if connections are
representations, they are superposed representations. And, given the standard notion of
superpositionality (see Van Gelder 1991; 1992; Clark 1993: 17-19), superposed
representations cannot be structurally similar to their targets.
Consider the standard definition of superpositionality. The definition is based on a further
technical concept, that of a vehicle being conservative over a target (Van Gelder 1991: 43).
Bluntly put, a vehicle V is conservative over a target T just in case the minimal set of
resources a system needs to leverage in order to represent T equals V. For instance, given the
representational resources of natural languages, “John” is conservative over John. To
represent John I need, minimally, to token “John”. Moreover, “John” has no “representational
space” left to represent something over and above John. On the other hand, “John loves
Mary” is not conservative over John. To represent John I need not token the entirety of “John
loves Mary”, and “John loves Mary” has some representational space left to represent
something other than John. Superpositionality can then be defined in terms of
conservativeness as follows: a vehicle V is a superposed representation of a series of targets
Ta...Tn just in case V is conservative over each member of Ta...Tn. Notice the plural:
superposed representations are always, by definition, conservative over more than one target
(Van Gelder 1992; Clark 1993: 17-19).
Structural representations, however, can be conservative over one target at most. If V is
the vehicle of a structural representation, then there is at least one target T with which V is
exploitably structurally similar. This entails that each relevant (i.e. similarity constituting)
constituent of V va...vn maps (in an exploitable way) onto one, and only one, constituent tx of
T. Now, if this mapping determines the content of each constituent, it seems that each
constituent of V entirely “spends its representational credit” to represent one and only one
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constituent of T. Hence, each constituent of V will be conservative over one, and only one,
constituent of T. By the same token, V will be conservative over one, and only one, target T.
Why can't a constituent vx be conservative over two (or more) constituents tx and ty,
making V conservative over T and T* (of which ty is a constituent)? Because it would have to
map onto many. But (exploitable) structural similarities are defined in terms of one to one
mappings (see O’Brien and Opie 2004: 11). Thus, it seems correct to say that if a vehicle
represents by means of (exploitable) structural similarity, then it is conservative over one, and
only one, target. Hence, if a vehicle is not conservative over one, and only one, target, then
the vehicle does not represent by means of exploitable structural similarity. But superposed
representations are not conservative over one and only one target. Hence, their vehicles fail to
satisfy exploitable structural similarity.
Couldn’t perhaps the relevant definition of structural similarity be relaxed, so as to allow
superposed representations to count as structural representations? Allowing structural
similarities to be defined in terms of one-to-many mappings would easily defuse my
argument. However, allowing one-to-many mappings makes the content of structural
representations disjunctive. In fact, if V is a structural representation of T and vx maps onto
many (e.g. onto both tx and ty), it follows that vx misrepresents only when both tx and ty are
not the case; and thus that vx represents (tx or ty). Notice that, formally, this is the same
problem faced by Wiese’s (2018) suggestion on how to assign content to vehicle constituents.
Summarizing: it seems correct to say that connections fail to satisfy distality. And, were
that verdict wrong, they would still fail to satisfy exploitable structural similarity. Hence, it
seems correct to conclude that, in the networks under scrutiny, connections do not qualify as
representational vehicles, given the theoretical commitments of inferentialist and
representationalist accounts of PP.
Perhaps my analysis thus far has been unfair. Perhaps it is the network as a whole that
Forthcoming on Synthese. Please refer to the published version: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03304-3 29/
51
instantiates the relevant generative model, rather than one of its parts (see e.g. Kiefer and
Hohwy 2018: 2394-2395; Wiese 2018: 219). Albeit I think this is a fair point, I fail to see
how it might challenge my conclusion. After all, it seems to me still correct to say that the
only things “of significance” to the network, given the task function it has by design, are
proximal sensory states. Thus, it seems to me that even conceding, for the sake of discussion,
that the network as a whole is, in some sense, exploitably structurally similar to its targets, it
would still fail to meet distality.
In this section, I presented the simplest PP system able to perform active inference I know
of, and checked whether the candidate vehicles of the relevant generative model (i.e. patterns
of activations and connections) actually qualify as vehicles, providing a negative answer.
Thus, albeit the network instantiates a simple generative model “knowing” the robot’s
sensorimotor contingencies, the structures instantiating that model do not qualify as
representational vehicles. They are non-representational structures instantiating the robot’s
knowledge of its own sensorimotor contingencies.
Notice that my verdict does not hinge on “weird” metaphysical premises on what counts
as a representation. Indeed, the criteria by which I assessed the metaphysical status of
generative models are derived from inferentialist and representationalist accounts of PP,
which surely provide the mainstream interpretation of the theory.
In the next section, I examine some concerns regarding the verdict here provided.
5 - Some worries considered
Here, I examine three distinct concerns regarding the argument I have provided. The first
regards the scope of my conclusion: can it be generalized to other PP systems? The second
and third worries have been raised by two anonymous reviewers. They concern, respectively,
the possibility of multiple assignments of contents and the revisionist implications of my
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argument. I examine these three worries in turn.
5.1 - Will it generalize?
The most obvious objection to the analysis provided above is that its conclusion will not
generalize to other PP systems. This is a genuine concern, which I cannot fully exorcise here.
I will, however, propose a number of arguments and considerations to the effect that my
conclusion is likely to generalize. To do so, I mainly consider the lines of reasoning that could
block the generalization, arguing that none, at present, seems sufficient to block it. Of course,
this is not a proof that my conclusion generalizes. To prove it, I would probably have to
examine all possible PP systems, which is clearly unfeasible.
One reason as to why my verdict will not generalize is that Bovet’s networks do not
resemble standard PP networks, such as Rao and Ballard’s (1999) network. The conclusions
drawn by looking at Bovet’s networks might simply not apply to different PP networks.
Yet, albeit it is surely correct to say that Bovet’s networks do not resemble other PP
systems, it is worth noting that there is no standard PP network. They are all different. For
instance, some PP networks do not have distinct error and prediction units (e.g. O’Reilly et
al. 2014), and others do not embody distinct sets of ascending and descending connections
(e.g. Matsumoto and Tani 2020). And, when it comes to robotic implementations, there just is
no standard PP model, connectionist or otherwise (Ciria et al. 2021). So, if the relevant
conclusions drawn from these various models are supposed to generalize (as their modelers
surely suppose), why shouldn’t the conclusions drawn from Bovet’s model generalize too?
Perhaps, then, the problem is that Bovet’s networks lack an ingredient which, when
considered, would force me to revise my verdict. But what could that ingredient be?
Hierarchy is an obvious candidate: Bovet’s networks are non hierarchical, whereas the
majority (but by no means all, see Tani 2014; Lanillos and Cheng 2018) of PP systems are.
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However, I simply fail to see how hierarchy would force me to revise my verdict. Adding
hierarchy means adding hidden layers and connections to (and from) these layers. But these
connections would be superposed representations just as the connections of Bovet’s network.
Thus, if the argument provided above is correct, they would surely fail to satisfy exploitable
structural similarity.30
Moreover, it is doubtful that the patterns of activity in hierarchically higher layers could be
assigned an appropriately distal content (O’Regan and Degenaar 2014; Dołega 2017: 12-13).
Strictly speaking, all a hierarchically higher level has to predict is what is going on in the
layer directly below it, of which it can thus be rightfully said to be a model. Computationally
speaking, hierarchically higher levels are said to “produce abstract statistical summaries of
the original visual input” (Bulow et al. 2016: 5-6; emphasis added; see also Hinton 2007b;
Foster 2019). Thus, if these computational descriptions are correct, and the mathematical
content assigned by these descriptions strongly constrains the ascription of representational
content, there are good reasons to expect that the content of hierarchically higher layers to be
only proximal.
Notice that sometimes this point seems to be acknowledged even by defenders of the
representationalist and inferentialist view of PP. As Orlandi and Lee (2019: 215-217) aptly
noticed, it is not uncommon, in the PP literature, to characterize higher levels as models of
the level directly below them, and to say that they predict the behavior of the level directly
below them (e. g. Clark 2016: 14-24). If these characterizations are correct, they definitely
suggest that the content of hierarchically higher layers is only proximal.
But what about the standard account of representations in hidden (i.e. hierarchically
higher) layers of artificial neural networks?31 Careful mathematical analyses conducted on the
31 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for having raised this objection.
30 A reviewer noticed I must here make a concession: I cannot exclude that, in a possible connectionist
implementation of PP, weighted connections will be structural, rather than superposed, representations. I surely
cannot rule out this possibility. However, at present, I do not see any positive reason to believe that such an
exceptional connectionist system will be produced.
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pattern of activation of those layers often reveal a structure-preserving mapping holding
between patterns of activation and features of the distal domain the network has been trained
to operate upon (e.g. Elman 1991; Shagrir 2012; Churchland 2012). This surely seems a hefty
consideration in support of a structural-representationalist reading of these patterns. So, were
similar patterns found in at least some PP systems, the representationalist-inferentialist
reading of PP would be bolstered.
I cannot in principle exclude that some form of mathematical analysis on PP models could
unravel similar patterns of activation. Yet, I do not believe that it would provide the desired
support to the inferentialist and representationalist reading of PP. There are two broad reasons
as to why that seems to me the case.
One is that the relevant structure-preserving mapping often holds among many patterns of
activation (if not the entire activation space, as in Churchland 2012) and their respective
targets. Yet, it seems correct to say that different patterns of activation are different vehicles.
Hence, the structural similarity would not hold between a single vehicle and its target (as it is
in the case of structural representations), but rather between an ensemble of vehicles and the
ensemble of their respective targets.
The other is that it seems correct to say that, if V is structural representation of T, then
changes to V which make it more structurally similar to T increase its representational
accuracy. Now, when it comes to artificial neural networks, the changes that increase their
representational accuracy surely include changes in the weighted connections. Hence, it
seems that weighted connections must be vehicle constituents (or relations thereof)
participating in the relevant structural similarity. Yet, in the case at hand, only patterns of
activation are considered. It thus seems doubtful that a structural similarity defined purely in
terms of patterns of activation will substantiate the representationalist reading of PP as
desired. However, simply “adding connections to the mix” raises the problems with
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superpositionality described above, marring the relevant structural similarity.
I take this to be only circumstantial evidence in favor of the claim that hierarchically
higher layers do not qualify as representations. So my argument is not conclusive: it could be
argued that hierarchically higher levels are, as a matter of fact, exploitably similar to some
distal target. And that might be done without violating the constraints mathematical contents
place upon representational contents. Yet, as far as I know, an argument to that effect has still
to be made. As things stand, I only see circumstantial evidence favoring the claim that higher
layers do not qualify as representational vehicles. It thus seems that the available evidence
favors my anti-representationalist verdict over the representationalist one.
A second missing ingredient from Bovet’s network is precision. This might be worrisome,
as PP suggests that precision plays a key role in enabling active inference (see Brown et al.
2013).
However, I believe that considering precision will not change my verdict. On the one
hand, precision is only supposed to modify, in various ways (see Friston 2012) the relevant
patterns of activation to which it is applied. But if, as I argued, these patterns of activation are
not representational vehicles in the first place, then any mechanism operating upon them
should not be considered a representational mechanism. Moreover, from the computational
point of view, precision is typically equated with the inverse variance of the predicted signal
(Buckley et al. 2017). If, as I’ve argued, predictions only have proximal content, and the
mathematical content of precision signals (i.e. inverse variance) constrains our ascription of
representational contents, it then seems we can only ascribe proximal contents to precision
signals too.
Perhaps the verdict I have provided here will not generalize because I’ve considered an
artificial neural network whose task functions have been proximally defined by a human
designer, whereas “natural” neural networks implementing PP have long-armed task
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functions. I think there are reasons to suspect this will not be the case.
To see why, it is important to notice that functions are normative: they are outcomes that a
system is supposed to produce, in virtue of its design (natural or artificial) or learning history.
Task functions (and, more generally, functions) dictate the standards against which to test the
performance of a system (e.g. Neander 2017, Ch. 3). A system can perform optimally or
abnormally only given the standards determined by its functions.
This seems to speak against PP systems having long-armed functions. Consider, for
instance, the fact that, on the account PP offers, perceptual illusions are optimal percepts
(Brown and Friston 2012). Now, if perceptual illusions are optimal percepts, it follows that
the machinery producing them (i.e. the PP system) is not malfunctioning when a perceptual
illusion is produced. But, if this is correct, then it seems that perceptual PP systems do not
have long-armed functions. That is, their functions do not appear to be defined in terms of
distal states of affairs (e.g. tracking the distal environment, recognizing the external causes of
the sensory inputs, etc). For the output produced by the system here does not match distal
states of affairs; hence, were the system’s function defined in terms of the latter, the system
would have been malfunctioning. As a consequence, perceptual illusions would not have been
optimal percepts.
Moreover, PP systems are often described as just in the task of minimizing prediction error
(e.g. Friston 2010; Hohwy 2015).32 In fact, the discussion about what PP systems are
supposed to do is typically couched in proximal terms, such as avoiding sensory states with
high surprisal33 or encountering the sensory states predicted by the model (see Hohwy 2020).
Notice that the purely proximal rendering of what PP systems are supposed to do is no
accident: it is actually needed to account for how these systems function in practice. Since PP
33 In extremely crude terms, surprisal is an information theoretic quantity (also known as self-information)
which captures how improbable a sensory state is, given a model.
32 Here, I trust neurocomputational modellers (e.g. Tani 2014; Spratling 2017) and consider free-energy
minimization as a PP algorithm, bracketing the complex relation between the free-energy principle and PP
“proper” (see Friston 2019; Hohwy 2020).
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systems have by assumption34 access only to proximal states, the relevant tasks they are
“supposed to” perform must be defined in terms of these states.
As further evidence of the proximal character of what, according to PP, generative models
are supposed to do, consider the so-called “dark room” problem (see Sims 2017 for
discussion). The problem is roughly as follows: why, if PP systems are only trying to
minimize prediction error, they do not lock themselves in environments delivering extremely
predictable stimuli, such as a completely dark room? Notice that such a problem would be
immediately dispelled if PP systems were assigned long-armed functions: if PP systems were
supposed to, say, find mates to reproduce (rather than just minimize prediction error) it would
be immediately clear why they do not end up in dark rooms: there just are no mates there.
Notice further that the standard reply to the “dark room” problem is not to concede that PP
systems are supposed to do more than minimizing prediction error. Rather, the reply is that
“dark room” sensory states are prediction-error inducing, given the models possessed by PP
systems (Friston, Clark and Thornton 2012).
All this suggests that, according to PP, all PP systems have to do can be spelled out in
proximal terms: they have to minimize the error relative to the expected sensory input. But if
this is the case, there seems to be little reason to think that “natural” PP systems will be
assigned long-armed functions. Thus, there seems to be little reason to think that “natural” PP
systems will satisfy both distality and exploitable structural similarity in the desired way.35
35 A reviewer wonders whether considering PP systems in the context of the free-energy principle could deliver
long-armed functions. The reviewer also points to Hohwy (2013: 179-181; expanded in Hohwy 2020) as
providing some argument to that effect. Now, I cannot introduce the free-energy principle here, but I think I can
make a few remarks motivating some skepticism about the free-energy principle providing long-armed
functions. The first remark is the following: all the free-energy principle “commands” is to minimize
free-energy, which is a quantity internal to systems. Indeed, it is precisely because free-energy is internal to
systems that free-energy is useful in the first place (see Hohwy 2020: 5-8). It is thus very hard to see how
abiding the free-energy principle would confer long-armed functions. Moreover, insofar PP is the “process
theory” by means of which the free-energy principle is abided, to minimize free-energy just is to minimize
prediction error on average (e.g. Friston 2009: 295; Hohwy 2013: 180). So, it seems that all the free-energy
principle “commands” PP systems to do is to minimize prediction error, and this seems to be a proximally
defined function. Lastly, it is not clear to me whether the normativity the free-energy principle brings to the table
is the normativity of functions in the relevant sense (Hohwy 2013: 181; 2020: 18-20 seems to agree). The
34 This assumption is a corollary of the assumption that sensory states are under-informative in respect to their
worldly causes (see Orlandi 2016 and Anderson 2017 for discussion).
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The verdict I provided could also be challenged arguing that Bovet’s networks enable the
robotic agents to perform only very “low level” sensorimotor coordinations with the
surrounding environment. Had I considered different (and, plausibly, more complex)
networks, enabling “representation hungry” tasks requiring coordination with non-present
targets, my verdict would have been different, as coordinating with non-present targets
requires representations to be in place (Clark and Toribio 1994). A related worry is that the
robots guided by Bovet’s network might be “merely reactive”: they just respond to the
incoming environmental inputs. Many hold that merely reactive behaviors do not require any
internal model, whereas proactive, self-generated behaviors do (e.g. Tani 2007; Pezzulo
2008). Both objections share a common theme; namely, that the networks upon which my
verdict is based is too simple of a model to allow my verdict to generalize to more complex
PP systems. However, I believe these objections are misguided in at least two respects.
To begin with, it is, as a matter of fact, false that the robots guided by Bovet’s network are
merely reactive systems enabling only low level sensorimotor coordinations. As a matter of
fact, in numerous experiments (e.g. Bovet and Pfeiffer 2005a; 2005b; Bovet 2006) the robot
self-initiated its own behavioral routines, because the network was expecting sensory inputs
that the environment did not deliver, thereby triggering active inference. Moreover, the
network architecture Bovet engineered is capable of delayed reward learning in the context of
T-maze tasks (Bongard and Pfeiffer 2005a; 2005b). In such tasks, however, agent and target
(reward36) are not immediately coupled, and so, from the point of view of the robotic agent,
36 A PP enthusiast might question my use of the word “reward” in this context, as active inference does not,
strictly speaking, posit rewards (see Friston, Adams and Montague 2012). It is thus worth noting that Bovet
himself acknowledges that “reward” and “punishment” are arbitrary tags, which he uses to simplify the
discussion. The “reward” modality of the net really only tracks the state of the robot batteries, and the reward
itself is a reduction of prediction error between the predicted and actually sensed state of the batteries (see Bovet
relevant normativity of the free-energy principle seems to be based on the very existence of free-energy
minimizing systems (e.g. “Rather, the FEP’s conceptual analysis allows us to see how existence (analysed as
self-organization) is at the same time both causal and normative”, Hohwy 2020: 16, emphasis added). A system
failing to abide by this kind of normativity, would simply “fail to exist” as a system. But, given the relevant
notion of function under consideration, something can exist, and yet systematically fail to perform its function
(Millikan 1989). To use a well-known example: malformed hearts are supposed to pump blood, but they always
fail to do so.
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the target is absent at the start of each trial. Furthermore, delayed reward learning is supposed
to require some form of working memory, which is needed to correctly associate cue, motor
decision and outcome (e.g. Kim 2004; see also Carvalho and Nolfi 2016). Thus, it seems to
me correct to say that delayed reward tasks in a T-maze setting are a bona fide instance of
“representation hungry” cognition. Nevertheless, that non-representational network managed
to solve the task with a high degree of accuracy, only by learning a set of relevant
sensorimotor associations. More precisely (but see Bovet and Pfeiffer 2005a; 2005b and
Bovet 2007: 123-153 for the full account), the network enabled the robot to solve the task
only by learning to predict shifts of visual flow conditioned on the activity of tactile sensors
stimulated by the cue. The mismatch between expected and actually received visual flow was
then minimized through active inference, thus making the robot turn so as to bring about the
expected visual flow. But by turning, the robot also entered in the correct arm of the T-maze,
thus “stumbling upon” the reward.37
Secondly, I do not think that these objections can be rightfully formulated within the
theoretical framework of PP, at least if really PP offers “a cognitive package deal” able to
account with the same set of resources for cognition in general (Clark 2016; Spratling 2016;
Pezzulo 2017). If really PP can account for all cognitive phenomena using the same set of
resources functioning in the same way, then it seems to me that representationalism or
anti-representationalism should be valid across the board. If these resources are
representational resources, then it seems that they will be representational even when they are
enabling simple sensorimotor interactions with a present target. And, if, as I’ve argued, these
resources do not qualify as representational, then they will not be representational even when
37 In this way, it seems to me that Bovet’s systems provide some empirical support to the enactivists’ claim that
complex non-representational structures instantiating sensorimotor knowledge are sufficient for
“higher”/”representation hungry” cognition (Kiverstein and Rietveld 2018; Bruineberg et al. 2019).
and Pfeiffer 2005a; 2005b). Notice further that, in Bovet’s architecture, a “reward” only aligns expected and
actually sensed battery states. Hence, “rewards” just are highly predictable sensory states, exactly as PP
suggests.
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the target they are enabling a system to proactively coordinate with is absent.
5.2 - Can the “two-level attribution” save representationalism?
My argument against Wiese’s (2018) appeal to Eliasmith’s theory of content presupposes
that vehicles can be assigned contents in only one way. But what if, as a reviewer asks,
vehicles could be assigned multiple contents according to multiple theories of content, based
on one’s explanatory focus? For instance, if one’s focus is centered on the inner workings of
Bovet’s network, it might be appropriate to assign it only proximal contents via exploitable
structural similarity. But if one’s explanatory focus is how the entire robot interacts with the
environment, it might be appropriate to assign it distal content resorting to Eliasmith’s theory
of content (or vice versa). Given that contents thus attributed sit at different explanatory
levels, they need not be mutually exclusive. Such a “two-level attribution”38 of content can
thus allow us to follow Wiese’s suggestion, without thereby inviting the problems I raised
before. How can I respond?
To start, I wish to point out an ambiguity. Talking of “assigning content” is ambiguous
between two readings. On a first reading, content assignments are mere ascriptions of
content: given our explanatory aims, we speak of a vehicle as if it represents something, but
as a matter of fact the vehicle does not represent that thing. This seems a form of content
pragmatism (Mollo 2020: 109). On a second reading, content assignments are not mere
ascriptions: the vehicle really has multiple contents, perhaps in virtue of the fact that it
satisfies multiple content-determining relations with multiple targets. Our explanatory
interests only select, among the many contents a vehicle really and objectively bears, the one
that best serves our explanatory needs.
Now, which is the intended reading of the “two-level attribution” the reviewer suggests? I
38 The phrase has been coined by the anonymous reviewer.
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think the second one. The reviewer is presumably trying to rescue Wiese’s (2018) account,
which espouses realism about content (as all the inferentialist and representationalist readings
of PP do). Moreover, it could be argued that inferentialist and representationalists accounts of
PP already ascribe multiple contents to vehicles: they do accept that a vehicle has both
mathematical and representational contents. Isn’t this a “two-level attribution” of the kind the
reviewer suggests?39
Yet, I see a problem with the “two-level attribution” thus interpreted. It can be exposed by
means of a simple example. Suppose V satisfies (at the same time) the conditions spelled out
by two theories of content C and C*. According to C, V represents T; whereas it represents
T* according to C*. Accept the “two-level attribution” as sketched above: V really and
objectively represents T as well as T*. Thus V has two contents, and we are free to “pick one”
based on our explanatory needs.
Now, V is a representational vehicle objectively bearing some content. So, there are some
tokenings of V which objectively are misrepresentations - but which ones? I think there are
only three possible cases:
(a) A tokening of V is a misrepresentation when T, and only T, is not the case
(mutatis mutandis for T*)
(b) A tokening of V is a misrepresentation when at least one among T and T* is
not the case
(c) A tokening of V is a misrepresentation when both T and T* are not the case
If (a) is accepted, then it seems that V represents only T (or only T*). It’s accuracy
conditions are sensitive only to Ts, just as those of a vehicle representing only Ts, and thus
having only one content, determined only by C (or C*).
If (b) is accepted, then V appears to be representing (T and T*). In fact, a vehicle
39 Perhaps it is, but an important difference should be noticed. Mathematical and representational contents are
different kinds of content (Egan 2014: 118). One is narrow, the other is (typically) wide. One is determined by
the computations a system performs, the other by some privileged naturalistic relation holding between vehicles
and targets. But the “two level attribution” the reviewer proposes assigns different contents of the same kind
(representational) to the same vehicle.
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misrepresenting when T or T* are not the case just is a vehicle representing (T and T*). But
then it seems that V has a single “conjunctive” content, determined by neither C nor C*.
If (c) is accepted, then V appears to represent (T or T*). A vehicle misrepresenting only
when both T and T* are not the case just is a vehicle representing (T or T*). But then, again,
V seems to have a single disjunctive content, determined by neither C nor C*.
So, it seems that, in all cases40, the “two-level attribution” view entails that V does not
have multiple contents, but only a single (perhaps disjunctive or “conjunctive”) content.
Moreover, in two cases out of three, that content is not determined by any of the theories of
content accepted (C and C*). This seems to put these theories under pressure, as it suggests
that those theories inadequately capture the content that representational vehicles bear. A
defender of the “two-level attribution” view might object that content is as a matter of fact
determined in a way that it is only partially captured by C and C*, and that only by wielding
them together we understand what vehicles really represent. But why then shouldn’t we resort
to a third theory C** “mashing up” C and C*? Indeed, if either option (b) or (c) is accepted,
C** looks desirable: it would be the single theory of content capturing the single
(“conjunctive” or disjunctive) content possessed by vehicles.
Now, the above is too quick of a discussion for me to declare that the “two-level
attribution” view is untenable. Its defenders might convincingly reply to my quick argument.
At present, however, the “two-level attribution” view does not really seem viable.41
5.3 - Radical revisionism?
A different reviewer asks how the anti-representationalism advocated here squares with
41 I’m also leaving the possibility of reading the “two level attribution” as a form of content pragmatism
undiscussed. Owing to space limitations, I cannot address content pragmatism here.
40 A reader might wonder why I have not considered option (b) when considering Wiese’s proposal. The answer
(embarrassingly) is that I had not noticed its viability when the manuscript was first conceived. Noticing the
presence of option (b), however, does not solve the problems with determinacy Wiese’s proposal suffers from.
Indeed, it seems to me that it makes them harder to solve. For now it is unclear whether following Wiese’s
suggestion delivers us vehicles representing (T or T*) or (T and T*).
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the representationalism of cognitive science. Am I committed to a strong form of
revisionism? I clearly cannot reply in full here. Yet, I can quickly motivate a negative answer.
To start, notice that I (as any other anti-representationalist) am committed to some form of
revisionism. Cognitive science really seems strongly committed to representationalism.
Arguing that certain structures are not representations or that no such commitment is present
(e.g. Ramsey 2007) is a form of revisionism: at least one ontological commitment of
cognitive science should be modified. How radical should the revision be? There are, I think,
two reasons as for why the anti-representationalism defended here does not seem to have
radically revisionist implications.
First, the anti-representationalist conclusion has been motivated using an artificial neural
network; and artificial neural networks surely are central in the current empirical practice of
cognitive science. The form of anti-representationalism I’m arguing for stems from cognitive
science as it is currently practiced, rather than some alternative research program developing
alternative empirical methods and research practices (e.g. Chemero 2009). So, at least prima
facie, the form of anti-representationalism argued for here does not invite a radical departure
from the current epistemic routines of cognitive science.
Secondly, in the context of the free-energy principle, generative models have already been
characterized as non-representational structures mediating agent-environment interactions
(Bruineberg and Rietveld 2014; Ramstead, Kirchhoff and Friston 2020). Indeed, it could be
argued that this sense of “model” is the core sense of model in the free-energy framework,
for, according to it, models, in the relevant sense, just are controllers (e.g. Seth 2015: 6-8).
So, in a way, my argument only extends an already existing conceptual characterization of
generative models from the free-energy principle to PP proper. Surely this isn’t a conceptual
revolution.
But what about the term “model” itself (as well as other representational terms)? Should
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we police our language so as to systematically avoid them? I think the answer is negative. As
hinted above, “model” has a technical meaning, which does not align with the
philosophically loaded meaning of models as structural representations; or so, at least, I’m
suggesting. But once the point has been made, I see no strong reason to systematically police
our language so as to erase any occurrence of “model”.
6 - Concluding remarks
In this essay I have argued that, given the theoretical commitments of representationalist
and inferentialist accounts of PP, the structures instantiating generative models do not appear
to qualify as representational vehicles. The physical realizers of generative models seem to be
just non-representational structures instantiating an agent’s knowledge of sensorimotor
contingencies. So, if the theoretical commitments of inferentialist-representationalist readings
of PP are correct, then PP does not seem to qualify as a representationalist theory of
cognition. And, if, as these views hold, PP really explains all aspects of our cognitive lives,
then it seems that PP invites a form of global anti-representationalism about cognition.
Contra (Gładziejewski 2016), PP might be as anti-representationalist as cognitive science
can possibly get.
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